U.S. Army Gen. Stanley McChrystal, commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force, listens to a question from a reporter during a press conference in the Pentagon May 13, 2010. (DoD photo by Master Sgt. Jerry Morrison, U.S. Air Force/Released)Obama's swift firing of Gen. McChrystal may not have been his "MacArthur moment," but rather an attempt to avoid one. President Barack Obama’s decision to accept – or force – the resignation of his top soldier in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, has been widely received as an act of wartime necessity. In a series of interviews with Rolling Stone, McChrystal and his subordinates showed poor judgement and an even poorer choice of words, disrespecting their civilian authorities, their colleagues, and the Afghan population they have risked their lives protecting. The subsequent and final White House meeting between the president and the general has made headlines as “Obama’s MacArthur moment.” The reference suggests parallels to Douglas MacArthur, another “runaway general,” and Harry Truman, the president who reined him in.
Indeed, Obama’s announcement of McChrystal’s resignation significantly resembles the wartime speech in which President Truman relieved Gen. MacArthur from his command in Korea. Like Truman, Obama has done his best to preserve the honour and integrity of his departing general, acknowledging him à la Truman as one of America’s “finest soldiers.”
More interestingly, though, Obama has also followed Truman’s lead in emphasizing the bigger picture on which his decision is based. Just as Truman reminded MacArthur’s supporters in 1951 that “the cause of world peace is more important than any individual,” so too has Obama reminded Americans in 2010 that “war is greater than any one man.” Having said that, the current president has himself equated – in degree if not in kind – McChrystal’s transgressions with those of MacArthur.
MacArthur’s insubordination during the Korean War is of course legendary. Yet Truman’s dismissal of him was not nearly as swift as Obama’s dismissal of McChrystal. In fact, it took months of insubordination, the kind of which openly defied official policy, before Truman resorted to the “Give ‘em hell” approach that many present-day Democrats have demanded of Obama on a wider scale.
MacArthur was officially relieved of duty on April 11, 1951. Truman, however, could very well have issued that same order on June 29, 1950. On that day, without consultation or approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or the president, MacArthur ordered the bombing of North Korean airfields, blatantly disregarding the U.S. policy of limiting the war below the 38th parallel.
The second opportunity to relieve MacArthur came the following month. In an unsanctioned visit to Formosa (Taiwan), the general took it upon himself to discuss with the Chinese premier-in-exile, Chiang Kai-shek, the recruitment and participation of his Nationalist Chinese troops in the Korean war effort. MacArthur also issued a statement that stressed the strategic importance of the exiled Chinese Republic and criticized the Truman administration for refusing to defend Formosa. The president’s response, far from punitive, directed MacArthur to retract his statement – which he did.
Unchecked, MacArthur’s insubordination grew steadily more dangerous. In September, the JCS had issued a directive prohibiting military operations by non-Korean forces in the northern provinces. In October, MacArthur unilaterally lifted that restriction while directing non-Korean forces close to the Chinese border to use all means necessary to complete the occupation of North Korea.
Not until the following spring, however, did Truman’s tolerance threshold for insubordination finally give way. The writing was on the wall for the rogue general after he released a communiqué in late March opposing the president’s plan to begin peace talks with the Chinese and North Koreans.
MacArthur tested on several occasions the sacred civil-military divide, relying on and even expanding along the way his reputation as an American war hero. For Truman, this created a decision-making process that factored strategic as well as political considerations.
The Obama-McChrystal affair falls short of that kind of complexity. Obama has not yet reached the midway point of his first term, and Stanley McChrystal has only been in the news for a little over a year. McChrystal though, like MacArthur, is a repeat offender. During the Obama administration’s sweeping review of U.S. policy in Afghanistan last October, McChrystal politicized that process by arguing for a troop surge in a speech he gave in London. In making the case for 40,000 additional troops, McChrystal publicly dismissed Vice President Joe Biden’s resistance to such a measure as “short-sighted.”
Since then, the administration has agreed on an Afghanistan policy that is in line with McChrystal’s desired surge strategy. The controversial Rolling Stone article that hit the news stands June 25 exposes no policy disputes between Obama and McChrystal. It does, on the other hand, reveal the human ugliness and frustration of war. That McChrystal allowed his team to vent with a reporter present, insulting simultaneously the nation whose uniform they wear and the nation whose people they are defending, represents a severe lapse of judgement and a moment of carelessness.
In the absence of an actual policy dispute, however, Truman may very well have avoided Obama’s sternness. McChrystal, though, lacks MacArthur’s public stature, which greatly reduces his margin for error. Obama’s response may yet prove to be an intelligent preventative measure meant to stop the carelessness in Afghanistan from escalating to dangerous MacArthur-like levels.
by Louie Milojevic
PhD candidate in history, American University.
